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1. Introduction 
Kalecki in 1943 c1arified that ful employment has two contradict meanings to firms. 
One is the increases in their sales and the other is no discipline of labours. Labourers 
can buy more consumption goods in the ful employment periods. But also it is easier 
for them to resist firms in order to raise their wages , because of their easiness to 
change their jobs. In the slumps , firms demand the government to increase aggregate 
demand , but firms do not like booms being continuing. He finally prophesied that , in 
the post Wor1d War I periods , there would be political business cyc1es (Kalecki , 1990). 
Kalecki thought that ful employment is always good to firms in the economical 
senses , because the government deficit raises profits (see , Kalecki , 1991 , pp.242-3). 
Even when ful employment raises real wages , profits do not decrease , if high real 
wages raise the sales of consumption goods in the same amounts (see , Ibid. , pp. 243-
4). To him , problems of ful employment lie only in the social or the political aspects. 
However , if investment is the decreasing function of real wages , or the increasing 
function of mark-up , ful employment may reduce profits (see , N ell , 1989 , pp .179-83 , 
and Marglin and Bhaduri , 1991). Growth in real wages means more consumption in 
one sense , but the profit squeeze in another. When mark-up rises , whether profits 
increase or decrease is determined by whether which factor is stronger. 
In the 1960s , the golden age of capitalism , rapid technical progress induced investｭ
ment. Higher mark-up can increase investment to achieve ful employment. In this 
age , unless labourers resist reducing their wages , economic growth with ful employm 
ent can be achieved. But , since oi1 crises , the age of the profit squeeze has begun. 
Slow technical progress decreases investment. However , also in this age , high mark 




The former is the case of the United States , and the latter is the case of Europe. 
However , other countries have important differences in institutions. Due to life-time 
employment system , firms in Japan can raise their profits more by increasing output. 
Besides , in Japan , risk of investment is shared with labourers and this induces invest 
ment. These factors make differences between the United States and Japan , in spite 
that real wages are flexible in both countries. On the other hand; in N orth Europe , 
where trade unions are strong to participate in the determination of investment , they 
can increase investment , irrespective of the profit squeeze. 
2. Basic Model 
In this chapter , we reformulate the short-period model on a Kaleckian line. Price is 
determined by adding profit margin to cost. For simplicity , we assume that there is 






where ρis the price level , m is mark-up , P is profit , and Y is national income. We 
express profit and national income as real terms , not nominal terms. In this chapter , 
mark-up is assumed to be given. Equation (2.2) shows that the rise in mark-up raises 
the profit share of national income. 
The consumption function is , 
C=(1-sw} W+(I-sp}P 
={12+(l-sp}m }Y 
m+ 1 m+ 1 
(2.3) 
where C is consumption , W is wage , and sw and ら are the propensities to save out 
of wage and profit. Wage is also as a real term. For we assume sp>sw , the rise in 
mark-up raises the average propensity to save. 
Firms' investment increases as their utilization rate or expected profit rate increases , 
or as risk of investment decreases. In the short period , where capital stock is given , 
the rise in income or profits raises the utilisation rate or profit rate. Expected profit 
rate is the increasing function of the actual profit rate. As a result , investment funcｭ
tion is the increasing function of income and profits. Yet future profit rate of investｭ
ment is uncertain , because the sales in the future are uncertain. Firms may not be 
able to sel their goods in the future as much as they expect now. But , even in such 
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cases , firms may earn some profits , when their mark-up is high enough. Firms' risk 
to invest is , therefore , the decreasing function of mark-up. Then , the investment funcｭ
tion is , 
/=/(Y, P, m) 。IJ _ ?. _ ? ~ ?
2/ _ ~ ð 2/ δ7 一一 >0 一一一 >0. -:一一 >0，一一一 >0 一一τ<0 一一一 <0δy. ~， ? . -， θmθy2 ' -， θIp2 -~， ? 2 (2.4) 
where 1 is investment. Profit motive is more important when profits are low , so does 
risk factor. On the other hand , firms need to invest more. when the utilisation rate 
is high enough. These factors determine the second order conditions. 
3. Mark-Up and Aggregate Demand 
N ational income consists of consumption and investment; 
y=c+/ 
r 1-S w • (1 -S p)m 1 =~一一丁+一一ーで一 f Y+/ (Y, P, m) 
lm+l m+l J 
By differentiating the equation (3.1) , we obtain the following equation; 
(3.1) 
笠一色三斗_Y +f!二三乙+日二五回 l 笠+笠+竺 .Z+笠.立 (3.2) 
dm - (m + 1 )2 't m + l' m + 1 J dm δm . ? dm . ? dm 
θ1/ .. .. "δぜ
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dY 
-一一 I θI θ1/1 dm(m+1)lum-(m+l) 一-m-lθYδIP J 
(3.3) 
At high mark-up with low national income , the numerator of the equation (3.3) is 
/ . / negaりve because 瓦 and 子 is smaller , and the denominator is positive because 手
and 言 is smaller. The reduction in mark-up would change the signs of the numerator 
and the denominator. When the sign of the numerator changes at first , the reduction 
in mark-up raises national income at high mark-up , but reduces at low mark-up. On 
the other hand , when the sign of the denominator changes at first , the reduction in 
mark-up raises national income at low national income , but reduces at high national 
income. Figure 1.1 shows the first case and Figure 1. 2 shows the latter. Labourers 
prefer higher wages and high employment. Real wages are in inverse proportion to 
mark-up and employment is in proportion to national income. As a result , labourers 
prefer lower mark-up and higher national income. 
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(3.4) 
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show the relationship between mark-up and profits. In the reverse 
“C"-shape case , mark-up which maximises profit is higher than the rate which 
Mark-Up Mark-Up 
Profits Profits 
Figure2. 1 Relationship between Mark-Up and Figure2. 2 Relationship between Mark-Up 
Profit : Reverse “ C" -Shaped Curve and Profit: “U" -shaped Curve 
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maximises national income , because higher mark-up raises the profit share. In the 
(2 ) 
“ U"-shape case , national income and profits are maximised at the same mark-up. 
N ow we define the stagnationist regime , the exhilationist regime and the mixed 
regime , after Marglin and Bhaduri (1991) , but with litle changes. The stagnationist 
regime is the economy where higher mark-up raises aggregate demand and profits. 
The exhilationist regime is the economy where higher mark-up reduces aggregate 
demand and profits. The mixed regime is the economy where higher mark-up raises 
( 3 ) 
aggregate demand but reduces profit(see , Marglin and Bhaduri , 1991 , pp.141-3). 
4. Technical Progress and Aggregate Demand 
The 1960s , the golden age of capitalism , was also the age of the technical progress. 
This chapter analyses the effects of technical progress on mark-up and aggregate 
demand. When national income does not change , technical progress might reduce 
investment. But when technical progress is capital embodied in some senses , the firms 
with new capitals are more competitive than those with old capitals. In such cases , 
technical progress induces investment. 
For simplicity , we assume here that technical progress increases investment in a 
given amount. This raises national 'income at the given mark-up. The rise in profits 
。I
duces ~一. The numerator of equation (3.3) is zero at the lower mark-up. The rise 
穡 
礫 一一 raise the mark-up at which the denominator is zero. At the very low investｭθY 
men凶t ， the curve 0ぱf mark-up and national income is reverse 
investment is larger , the curve turns at the lower mark-up. The region of the stagnaｭ
tionist regime becomes wider. But more rise in investment changes the curve to “ U"-
shaped , because investment rises national income and rise in national income induces 
more investment. 
At the very high technical progress periods , the rise in mark-up can raise national 
income and fulfil ful employment. But mark-up should be very large and real wages 
very low. On the other hand , in the ful or near ful employment periods , power of 
labourers is stronger. Labourers may not admit low real wages. This resistance of 
(2) In our model , risk is the decreasing function of mark-up. As a result , risk-averse 
firms would prefer higher mark-up than the rate which maximises profit. 
( 3) Figure l.1 and 2.1 are reverse "C" -shaped , while those of Marglin and Bhaduri would 
be 





Figure 3 Technical Progress and Shift of Curve 
labourers may not fulfil the ful employment even in the periods of the rapid technical 
progress. 
5. Fle:xibility of Labour markets and Mark-Up: The United States and Europe 
Since the 1980s , the unemployment rate in the United States has been lower than 
those in many countries in Europe. But , in the United States , real wages of manual 
labours have been decreasing. In this chapter , we analyse the relationship between 
real wages and unemployment in the profit squeeze age. 
In the age of the rapid technical progress , aggregate demand may be high enough 
to achieve ful employment. But , in the age of the slow technical progress , because 
of weak investment motive of firms , economic growth with ful employment is difficult. 
Labourers' choice between high real wage and employment is very severe. But , also 
in this age , labourers' choice has some influences on macroeconomic performances. 
In Europe , social insurance systems are advanced and trade unions are strong. 
Labourers prefer unemployment to lower real wages in these situations. This causes 
high unemployment. On the contrary , in the United States , real wages are more flexiｭ
ble to unemployment , because of backward social insurance systems and weak trade 
unions. This flexibility reduces unemployment. 
The age of the slow technical progress is also the age of the class conflicts. The 
lower mark-up raises real wage , but reduces profits. In this age , labourers should 
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Mark-Up 
National Income 
Figure 4 Flexibility of Mark-Up and National Income: 
Europe and the United States 
choose high real wages or employment. In the countries where social insurance systems 
are advanced and trade unions are strong , real wages are sticky and there is high 
unemployment. On the other hand , in the coulltries which have flexible market mecha 
nism , real wages wi1 be low enough to absorb the unemployed. After all , flexibility 
of real wage or mark-up is the cause of the contrast macroeconomic performances 
between the United States and Europe. 
6. Life-Time Employment System and Aggregate Demand: Japan 
In Japan , wage is much flexible to employment as in the United States. But , at least 
in full-time labourers in large firms , the life-time employment system is usual in 
Japan. Lay-off is rare in Japan , while usual in the United States. From a different 
view , it can be assumed that labourers in Japan are content with cutting wages in 
the recession for insuring their employment. 
Employment in J apan is not in proportion to outputs. For simplicity , we assume 
here that the employment function in J apan consists of the stable labours and the 
proportional part of national income. Since variable wage cost per output is one , the 
1 coefficient of the proportional part is ~， where w is wage. Then , 
w 
L寸 Y+Lo (6.1) 
where L is employment. Hence , profit is , 
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(6.2) 
ln Europe where mark-up is rigid , the profit share would also be rigid. In the 
United States where the mark-up is the decreasing function of national income , the 
profit share is also the decreasing function of national income. But , in ]apan , although 
the mark-up is the decreasing function of national income , the profit share is the 
increasing function , because of the rigidity of employments. Then the consumption 
function is; 
rl-sw • (1 ーら)ml=i ..~: + \..~__:ー~ Y+ (s.-sw) wLo 
lm 十 1 m+l J 
(6.3) 
In ]apan , labourers are content with high mark-up. This certainly reduces consumpｭ
tion. But it is not very low compared with mark-up , since wages of stable labours 
sustain it. Besides , in ]apan , flexibility of wages reduces risk of firms to invest , 
because , even if investment is in failure , firms can recover their profits partly by 
reducing wages. As a result , in ]apan , aggregate demand at a given mark-up would 
(4 ) 
be higher. Fi思lre 5 shows this relationship. 
Mark-Up 
National Income 
Figure 5 Life-Time Emploment System and Aggregate 
Demand: Japan 
(4) But in Japan , fixed labour costs will absorb profits , when national income is very 
low level. In such circumstances , investment is much lower in Japanese system than 
in other economic systems. Aggregate demand and profits are also much lower. However , 
- 8 ー
Institutions and Macroeconomic Performances in the Profit Squeeze Age 
7. Labour Control and Aggregate Demand: N orth Europe 
We assumed that investment is determined by firms only. But now , in many countries , 
trade unions take part in the conferences with firms on their managements. Through 
these conferences , labourers can have some inf1uences on investment. N orth Europe , 
especially Sweden , are the typical countries. 
Labourers choose high real wages in North Europe , where social insurance systems 
are much advanced and trade unions are very strong. Because of low mark-up , firms 
would not like to invest. But labourers would like to invest and they have power to 
do so. The investment function would be shifted rightwards , as the power of trade 
union is stronger. This raises aggregate demand. In consequences , in N orth Europe , 
(5 ) 









Figure 6 Labour Control and Aggregate Demand: 
North Europe 
8. Conclusion 
Since the oil crisis , the slow technical progress has weakened investment motive of 
when such situations 、 continue ， firms do not sustain the life-time employment system. 
To be shortly , ]apanese system can work , only when aggregate demand is sustained at 
the high level in the long run. 
( 5) In N orth Europe , mark-up is lower , but profits may not be lower , because of high 
investment and national income. 
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firms. In such an age , maintenance of high employment is very difficult. But , even in 
such an age , we have some choices: the roads of the capitalist countries are not one. 
Many countries in Europe choose high wages and the United Stat白 high employment. 
These differences may be due to the social insurance systems and the powers of trade 
unions. However , there are other factors to have some influences on macroeconomic 
performances. In J apan , the life-time employment system is prevailing. This sustains 
consumption and investment. On the other hand , in N orth Europe , trade unions are 
the partners of managements. Labourers can have some influences on investment , 
through conferences between firms and trade unions. This makes it possible to invest 
in low mark-up situations. 
References 
Kalecki , M. (1990) ,“Political Aspects of Full Employment ," in Osiatynski , J. (ed.) , Colｭ
lected W orks 01 M ichat Kalecki , Vol. 1: Cゆitalism: Business Cycles and Full Em，ρloyment， 
Oxford , Oxford University Press. 
Kalecki , M. (1991) , Theoη， 01 Economic 均mamics: An Essay on Cyclical and Long-Run Chanｭ
ges in Ca，ρitalist Economy, in Osiatyñski , J. (ed.) , Collected 砂rorks 01 Michal Kalecki, Vol.I: 
Caρitalism: Economic 均mamics， Oxford , Oxford University Press. 
Marglin , S.A. and Bhaduri , A. (1991) ,“Profit Squeeze and Keynesian Theory ," in N ell , 
E. J. and Semmler , W. (eds.) , Nicholas Kaldor and M ainstream Economics:・ Coηかontation
or Conve増'enceλLondon ， Macmillan. 
Nell , E. (1989) ,“The Rate of Profit in Kalecki' s Theory ," in Sebastianì , M. (ed.) , Kaleｭ
cki's Relevance Today , London , Macmillan. 
-10 -
